Another facet of the spatiotemporal hold that appears to be essential to conscious experience is that peripheral stimulations immediately engage a much larger cortical field than do Libet's cortical stimulations. Electrical excitation of the sciatic nerve, for instance, evokes reposes over the entire central part of the cerebral convexity (including the so-called motor and premotor cortex) even in anesthetized monkeys (Malis, Pribram and Kruger (1953). In addition, my colleagues and I identified a mediobasal (limbic) motor cortex that governs viscero-autonomic processing involved in conditioning, learning and remembering (Kaada, Pribram and Epstein 1949; Pribram, Reitz, McNeil and Spevak 1979 reviewed by Pribram 2003).
But these mediobasal and classical precentral “motor” cortexes do more than control particular movements or viscero-autonomic effects per se. They are, in fact, sensory cortexes controlling action, that is, the projected achievement of a target (the evidence for this statement is reviewed in Pribram1971 and 1991). As such they encode what Skinner called “behavior”, the environmental consequences of an action, enlisting whatever movements necessary to carry out the act. (Skinner stated that for him, the behavior of an organism is the paper record of accumulated responses that he took home to study.) When the precentral process contributes to awareness, if at all, it is of the errors in the environmental consequences of the behavior not the trajectory of the sensory receptors (the scans) or the movements by which to accomplish a percept or an action. The parallel in vision is that we do not sense the trajectory of saccades, only the visual image effected by them. Visual image and the environmental consequences of an action come to awareness some time later than the saccade and the movement itself.
Stimulation of the classical central (Rolandic) sensory and motor cortex should not be coordinate with awareness. If we were aware of our actions at the time they are occurring, we would mess them up (Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960). Imagine being aware of your tongue and palate as you are giving a talk – in fact occasionally when your mouth becomes dry, you do become aware and just can't go on. Or playing tennis or batting at baseball – the adage is “keep your eye on the ball”. When taking notes during a lecture, conscious attention is on what the lecturer is saying not the writing of notes. Furthermore, the receptors and muscle contractions, the movements involved can vary according to whether one is watching a video, listening to the professor, using a writing pad, a laptop computer or standing at the blackboard. To repeat: the primary sensory and motor systems provide the encoded intended consequences of an action, not just the particular movements needed to carry them out. Thus, these systems need to function autonomously during the course of an action; only when, after a spatiotemporal hold, they act in concert with other brain systems do they participate in organizing any necessary change in future acts by way of conscious intervention.
There is another piece of evidence that supports the involvement of a spatiotemporal hold in achieving both conscious experience and learning. When we first began to study event related brain electrical potential changes (ERPs) we learned a great deal by using what is called an odd-ball technique. A particular stimulus is presented repeatedly and occasionally a different (but somewhat related) stimulus is randomly interposed in the series. The recorded ERPs are then averaged separately for the two types of stimulus presentation. The averaged records for the two types of stimuli are dissimilar especially around 300 millisec. after the presentation of the stimulus. We interpreted the change in the ERP for the odd-ball stimulus as indicating that an update in the perception of the stimulus sequence was occurring. But subsequent experimentation showed that another dissimilarity in ERPs could be observed at around 400 millisec. and that updating did not occur (i.e the dissimilarity at 300 msec. continued unchanged) unless the 400msec. dissimilarity was present. In short, the dissimilarity at 300 millisec. indicates that an update (often consciously experienced) is necessary and the one that occurs at 400 millisec. heralds the actual updating (that is, learning is occurring). According to all this and much other evidence (reviewd by Pribram and McGuinness 1992) achieving conscious awareness involves specific brain systems and takes processing time.
The Road to Supervenience:
Ignoring the spatiotemporal hold has led some philosophers to opt for one of two very different accounts of the relationship between our conscious experience and brain processes: one such account states that, in fact, there is no relationship, that conscious experience is a useless epiphenomenon (reviewd but not adopted by Velmans, 2000) which in the extreme would hold that consciousness was invented by God to torture us. Another attempted explanation, somewhat less extreme, is that the relationship simply exists by virtue of supervenience, that is, an immediate, unexplained, downward causation.
The problem with the epiphenomenon view is that there is much evidence against it: Often the pen is mightier than the sword. We imagine musical instruments and musical phrases and stir others when we implement them.
As for supervenience, the major problem is to account for “how” it is accomplished (Velmans 2000). Just what might be the relation between ineffable conscious mind and palpable matter? According to the view proposed earlier in this essay, the answer lies in the complementary relationship between matter and mind as a two way dependence of ex-formation (matter) on in-formation (communication) and information on ex-formation -- in less technical language: on information processing by virtue of brain processes. Pursuing this formulation of the issue goes a long way toward resolving this issue.
But another issue needs a different resolution. Much of what we consciously experience is indeed an emergent epiphenomenon (unless we can get to use it in a talk show). Non-conscious, automatic processing takes up the major portion of the brain's metabolism. The question so put asks: What brain systems and processes are responsible for that aspect of conscious experience that supervenes on brain processes so as to modify them for future use and how does it do so?
My answer is that much of conscious experience is only initially epiphenomenal; and further, that supervenience occurs by virtue of the spatiotemporal hold. It is the hold that allows behavior, defined as the consequence of the organism's action, to mediate the registration of an experience so that it becomes available to the brain's future processing. Conscious experiences are initially emergent from brain processes produced by input generated in the brain by physiological, chemical, physical and sociocultural environment . When changes occur in that environment changes are produced in the brain processes. Only when these peripheral changes become implemented in the brain's memory do the resultant experiences become accessible to further processing.
Implementation is stepwise: The environmental patterns that form conscious experience induce a neural pattern, that is, a temporary dominant focus, an attractor. The neural pattern develops over 300 msec. when novelty is encountered (novelty can be generated internally as when there is a shift in perception of an ambiguous figure such as a Necker cube.) Over another 100 milliseconds the attractor, the temporary dominant focus, gains extended control over brain processing, for instance through spectral phase locking between frontal and posterior cortices. (For an interesting, somewhat less brain detailed view somewhat similar to mine, see Gabora, 2002.)
Consciousness of an experience, when attained, thus can affect subsequent automatic brain/behavioral processes by virtue of gaining control over them, allowing changes to occur consonant with the experienced novel context. In a sense the experience itself is momentarily an epiphenomenon: though produced by inputs to the brain, these brain patterns and the conscious experiences are ordinarily fleeting and do not immediately become coordinate with any lasting brain patterns. The effect of the conscious experience has to become proactive.
Thus supervenience is not effected by some immediate conscious mental pattern being impressed on (or matched to) a pattern of brain processes. Supervenience depends on a spatiotemporal hold that makes possible several shifts in brain processing away from sensory and viscero-autonomic inputs, shifts in the location of temporary dominant foci (attractors). These shifts allow the brain patterns coordinate with the initial experience to co-opt other brain processes that ultimately control consequent behavior. Behavior, in turn, modifies viscero-autonomic and sensory processes that in their turn modify subsequent shifts in attractors until the novel experiences become implemented. More on this under “Attention”.
MODES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE :
Types of Brain Organizations:
In earlier presentations (Pribram 1976 ;1977) I identified three modes within which the attractors operating in the brain help organize our experience. These modes are states, contents and processes. Conscious states are organized primarily by neurochemical states. The wealth of psychopharmacological influences on moods such as depression and elation, attests to this relationship. The biochemical and biophysical substrates of anesthesia, sleep and dreaming are being investigated at the synaptic, dendritic, membrane, channel and microtubular scale (see for example, E. Roy John 2000; Hameroff 1987; Hameroff and Penrose 1995; Jibu, Pribram and Yasue, 1996). This active field of investigation is handled in those publications.
The contents of consciousness, ordinarily spoken of as perception, are addressed by DeValois and DeValois (1988) and in my book “Brain and Perception” (1991). The wealth of evidence is reviewed that has been obtained in my laboratory and those of others, on how different brain processes influence the organization of the contents of consciousness.
In a more recent paper entitled “Brain and the Organization of Conscious Experience” (Pribram 1999) I addressed additional issues that, from the traditional philosophical perspective, are addressed under the concept “intentionality”. Intentionality is, in these traditions, defined differently from intention in the sense of purpose (which will be discussed later in the current essay under the topic “Free Will”). Also “intensionality” (addressed under the heading “Attention”) differs from intentionality. Intensionality concerns the intensive aspects of experience that are contrasted to its extensional aspects.
To return to the concept “intentionality”: Franz Brentano (1929/1874) noted that just as all of our intentions need not be actualized, so also our perceptions are directed toward an object but the object need not be realized. Brentano spoke of “intentional inexistence” using the parallel between unfulfilled intended acts and unfulfilled perceptions as in imagining a unicorn. Husserl simplified Brentano's term to “intentionality” again emphasizing that the process need not refer to an actual sensory input.
Human clinical, and experimental evidence obtained with non-human primates, has shown that the systems centered on the posterior convexity of the brain are involved in the intentional aspect of conscious experience. Separate such brain systems can be distinguished: those controlling egocentric (body-centered), allocentric (beyond the body, outer-centered) and object centered “spaces”. By contrast the basal frontolimbic forebrain is critically involved in the intensive aspects of experience in terms of experiencing episodes of novelty and of disruption of ongoing processes. These same parts of the brain control a readiness to bind these episodes together into a narrative. (Pribram 1999; Pribram and Bradley 1998); Newberg and d'Aguili 2001; Koechlin, Ody and Kouneiher, 2003).
However, these very same brain organizations are molded by biological and social factors that are, in turn, organized by the brain organizations. Human brains are critical to the invention of bicycles, the writing of novels and the construction of economic systems that, in turn, mold brain organization. The phenomenological approaches to conscious experience taken by Brentano, and his followers, Husserl (1931) and Heidegger (1966) acknowledge these interrelationships, but do not detail the necessary experimentally based data (especially what the brain and behavioral sciences currently have to offer) that pulls it all together.
Nor does their “Lebenswelt” (Husserl) or “In-der-Welt Sein” (Heidegger) detail the structural precision of the processes that are involved in the reach from being to becoming in the material aspects of the world that is the essence of Ilya Prigogine's contribution (e.g. Prigogine 1980; Prigogine and Stengers 1984). Prigogine provides such structure in descriptions of self-organizing systems forming far from equilibrium. Further details of such processes have been worked out (see for instance conference proceedings edited by Pribram 1994 and by Pribram and King 1996) in terms of phase spaces that contain attractors that “pull” rather than causally “push” organizational complexity. What needs to be done is to place these data based advances in the theory of matter into the framework of phenomenological analysis in order to forge a comprehensive theoretical frame for a science of psychology (see Heelan 1963; Pribram 1981).
The processing mode of conscious experience binds state with perceived content and content with state. I am in a state of hunger and thirst and suddenly perceive hitherto ignored restaurant signs all over the place even when they are in written in the Russian alphabet (the Zeigarnik 1972 effect). I am on my way to work, urgently considering the day's tasks when I pass a doughnut shop. Perceiving the fresh baking odors stops me in my tracks, I perceive the store window with its display and I go in and buy a couple of the doughnuts because now I am in a new state, I feel hungry.
Conscious processing can, in turn, be parsed into 1) attention as pre-processing sensory, kinesthetic and visceral inputs; 2) thinking as pre-processing remembering; and 3) intentions as pre-processing motor output. These pre-processings will form the grist to the mill of the remainder of this essay.
Attention:
At one point William James exclaimed that he was tired of trying to understand consciousness and that we should stick to understanding attention. But, of course, he did no such thing. Nonetheless attention is a good starting place to examine the issue as to how in-formation supervenes on the ex-formation of the brain.
Skinner's realization that brain is critically involved in the operant conditioning process provides the key to explanation. Experience does not immediately supervene on neural processing during a perception or an action. Rather, at any moment, neural patterns are generated by a novel and unexpected sensory input or composed by an internal set of ongoing events. These neural patterns act as temporary dominant foci, as attractors. (A review of the experimental evidence that leads to the concept of a temporary focus is in Pribram 1971 Languages of the Brain pp 78-80). The neural circuits involved operate efficiently to preprocess further sensory input or preprocess an action. Ordinarily these preprocessings proceed with no time for “mind to accompany them” as Sir Charles Sherrington so eloquently put it. Once preprocessing is completed, control shifts automatically to other patterns in response to current demands -- unless there is an intervention by some novel happening (see Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960: Plans and the Structure of Behavior). Much has been made of an action-perception cycle. By contrast, what I am emphasizing here is an automatic-conscious processing cycle.
The automatic (unconscious) processes are, at any moment, more like feedforward programs than error sensitive processes subject to correction by feedback. We are not aware of the process by which we prehend an object. As noted, this is a good thing – we'd only mess-up. So, does that leave us with all conscious experience as an epiphenomenon? Not at all. After I reflexly remove my hand from a hot flame, I contemplate the happening. Our cat is an excellent example: he looks at his paw and licks it – then looks at the offending object and reaches out toward it but this time does not touch it. He repeats this procedure several times over. If I may anthropomorphize, the cat's conscious awareness of the incident, his ERP at 300 millisec. and the later change at 400 millisec. indicate how awareness of what has happened alters (preprocesses) future behavior. In the example given, the cat's attentional preprocessing reinforced the change in subsequent behavior several times – in operant conditioning terms the cat's observational behavior was shaping the changes in his behavior. And the non-behavioristic claim is that the shaping can occur, not only non-consciously, but also by way of conscious awareness of what is happening. Conscious attention shapes subsequent behavior.
Thinking:
What about the patterns that characterize our thought processes? Do they supervene directly onto patterns of brain activity? Freud as well as many others defined thought as implicit action and based his talk therapy on that principle. According to the view that I have here assembled, implicit action, remains implicit, that is, we remain unaware of the ongoing processing. Freud pointed out that these preprocesses constitute the person's memory when looked at retrospectively and at the same time they are that person's motivation when looked at prospectively (Pribram and Gill 1976). When we become aware of the results of this preprocessing, that is, when we consciously think about something, we actually do involve the body's effectors, muscles and glands. Watson was not far off in his physiological behaviorism. Evidence continues to accumulate that very slight changes in muscle tone or in breathing or heart rate variability occur during thinking (See, for example a review by McGuigan 1976). William James and more recently Antonio Damasio have called attention to the involvement of feelings as bodily responses to what happens and how these feelings influence cognition and the making of choices (Damasio, 1994). What is being made explicit is that these physiological body responses change brain preprocessing (re-membering) so that subsequent thinking becomes modified.
My claim therefore is akin to that made by William James: but adds whole body attitudinal inputs and additionally, the environmental consequences of behavior. For the preprocessing of memory that motivates a thought to become conscious it must be “taken to heart” and acted upon through viscero-autonomic, gestural or subvocal acting out. Action on the body and on the world must take place, albeit sometimes only subliminally and tentatively, to shape the memory-motive structures, the temporary dominant foci, the attractors characterizing the patterns of brain pre-processes in thinking.
Karl Popper is close to this formulation in his concept of the necessary interaction among “Three Worlds” to achieve consciousness. Popper's three worlds were brain, culture and mentation. Contemporary suggestions indicate that a “Fourth World”, the body, must be added to these interactions. Thus and only thus can the pen be mightier than the sword,
Intention as Free Will:
Taking the primacy of conscious experience as the starting point of inquiry resolves not only such issues as “downward” causation as handled in the previous sections, but also the issue of free will. A scientific reading of what constitutes freedom would state that although one's actions are constrained in a variety of ways, the measure of the degrees of freedom that remain is experienced as free will. Voluntary, intended, behavior rests on a parallel feed-forward pre-process in which a signal presets the execution of the process (Helmhotz 1909/1924; Sperry 1947; Teuber 1964). Helmholtz used as example the saccadic movements of the eyes that place the retina where it needs to be to receive the “desired” input, that is, the target of the intent.
Much has been made of the fact that brain processes can be recorded prior to the execution of a voluntary act. But, as noted, thank goodness my behavior is not burdened with continuous conscious experience appropriate to the behavior. Even my spontaneous lectures in a classroom run off at a rate that would be impeded by any awareness of how I am saying something. Awareness comes from watching the faces of the students – I must slow down, ask for questions etc
In more technical terms, contrary to Einstein's view, God does play dice with the universe and with you and me. The six-sided die even has numbers on it -- it is highly constrained, determined. But throw the dice (two of them) and you have a great many possibilities as to how they will land. The initial conditions are determined by the six-sided dice -- the throw, the dynamics, are constrained only by gravity and the gaming table, and, for all practical purposes remain remarkably undetermined. And conscious experience, because it comes late allows humans to influence future contextual constraints (the gaming table) on the basis of their experience -- else how would casinos stay in business?
In short, my claim is that freedom comes from action, from doing something with the constrained anatomy, the structure of the situation. As described by non-linear dynamics, the future is dependent on initial conditions and the constraints operating at any moment. These determine the degrees of freedom, the state space within which the trajectories of the process must operate. Equally important is the noise in the system so that the action is not constrained only by the first attractor that is encountered (the first well in the landscape -- that is why the roulette wheel is actively rotating). In experiments my colleagues and I performed (Pribram, Reitz, McNeil and Spevack, 1979) studying classical conditioning in amygdalectomized monkeys the animals to failed to become conditioned. The failure was shown to depend on the reduction (when compared with the behavior of normal control subjects) of variability (noise) in their initial responses to the unconditioned stimulus and were therefore unable to bridge the time gap necessary for them to connect the conditional stimulus to the unconditioned stimulus. Simply put, they were more constrained, more compulsive than their controls.
CODA
Pervasive Consciousness:
Defining an aspect of conscious experience in terms of narrative indicates that experience partakes of a larger consciousness, tunes into that more encompassing knowing together. Taking the stance that I have done in this essay, there is only a step from the existential conscious experience of living in this physical, biological, social and cultural world to defining the cultural world as spiritual. By spiritual I mean that our conscious experience is attracted to patterns (informational structures?) beyond our immediate daily concerns. Such patterns may constitute quantum physics, organic chemistry, history, social interactions, economics or religious beliefs. These interests all comprise stories and the same part of the brain that is involved in creating the narrative “I” is involved in partaking in these other narrative constructions (see 1998, Pribram and Bradley 1998).
The search for understanding is indeed a spiritual quest whether esoteric, artistic or scientific. Understanding consciousness as developed in this essay ought to go a long way toward unifying these quests.
Summary:
Taking conscious experience as primary from which all (including scientific) knowing is derived, resolves many of the issues now so fervently debated by both philosophers and scientists. First: the privacy of conscious experience is contested: in fact, it is conscious experience, as opposed to unconscious processing, that is the medium of communication.
Second: communication, minding, replaces ineffable mind in portraying the matter/mind relationship. Mapping this relationship by means of the Fourier transformation, matter can be seen as an “ex-formation” constructed from a basic holographic-like flux from which minding is also constructed as “in-formation.” Matter and minding are mutually dependent on one another: it takes mathematical minding to describe matter and minding, communication, cannot occur without a material medium.
Third: Given this portrayal of the matter/minding relationship, certain aspects of information processing by the brain can be tackled. To begin, the timing within circuits of the brain cannot be within experienced time (duration) because the paths of conduction are varied with regard both to length and fiber size that determine speed of conduction. If communication of a pattern and/or synchrony is to be achieved, a higher order spacetime such as that developed in relativity theory must be operative.
This is one indication that the brain processes coordinate with conscious experience must be forged much as a musical instrument must be forged to provide a medium for the production of music. Forging takes place within spacetime and involves not only brain processes per se but inputs from and outputs to the body as well as the physical and sociocultural environment.
On the basis of identifying brain systems coordinate with consciousness, at least two modes of experience can be identified: a) an “objective me” distinguishable from an objective other, and b) a “monitoring, narrative I” constructed of episodes and events. Paradoxically, the same brain processes that are coordinate with the “monitoring, narrative I” are also coordinate with experienced spirituality.
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